Government and Collective Bargaining, by Fred Witney by Spielmans, John V
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 1 Article 8
Fall 1951




Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Spielmans, John V. (1951) "Government and Collective Bargaining, by Fred Witney," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 27: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol27/iss1/8
BOOK REVIEWS
GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. By Fred Witney.*
Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1951. Pp. viii, 741. $6.00.
In an earlier recent study' Professor Witney focused his attention
on a very special aspect of government and collective bargaining, namely
the wartime work of the NLRB. In the present, much more exhaustive
work he deals comprehensively with the subject, tracing the develop-
ment of the influence of government on collective bargaining in the
United States from early beginnings to the present. Yet, while compre-
hensive in its chosen field, as to collective bargaining the book confines
itself to one particular aspect: governmental influences. Therein it differs
greatly from various other recent texts on collective bargaining 2 which,
in covering many other matters such as union history, principles of union
organization, bargaining procedures and techniques, grievance and strike
procedure, dispute settlements, etc., usually devote only a chapter or two
to the influence of government.
Thus, as to subject matter, Mr. Witney's book is comparable to
Gregory's Labor and the Law; but it differs greatly as to treatment,
giving far less consideration to the analysis, comparison, and original
evaluation of legal opinion, and far more to the recounting of socio-
economic developments and circumstances-always appraised in the light
of Mr. Witney's unflinching union sympathies. In fact, the book is
not meant for the specialized student of labor law, but, according to
the author's own statement in the preface, as a text for students of
Liberal Arts and Commerce.
The general arrangement is based on the almost dramatic dialectics
under which the development of the union movement in the United
States appears to its friends. After a brief introduction concerning the
nature and significance of collective bargaining, the first major part
deals with the phase of "Legal Suppression of Collective Bargaining,"
reaching from the early nineteenth century to the end of the 1920's:
,he conspiracy doctrine; the rise and flowering of the labor injunction;
prosecutions under the Sherman Act, interwoven with the hopes and
disappointments of the Clayton Act. All this is told at the hand of the
* Assistant Professor of Economics, Indiana University.
1. WiTNEY, WARTIME EXPERIENCE OF THE NATIONAL LABOk RELATIONS BOARD,
1941-45 (1949).
2. See, e.g., CHAMBERLAIN, CoLLECTivE BARGAINING (1951); DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1951); RANDLE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1951).
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long-famous test cases demonstrating the liberal opinions of H61mes and
Brandeis as yet outweighed by those of their more conservative col-
leagues.
The next part, "Government Encouragement of Collective Bar-
gaining," treats the New Deal era. A full treatment is given to the
Norris-La Guardia Act (which "strangely enough . . . was not signed
by Roosevelt") ;3 a rather slight account'of the Railway Labor Act of
1934; with full emphasis finally on the Wagner Act, its origins, its
content and significance, its operation under the evolving policies of the
NLRB, and its general impact on the American labor movement.
With the next two parts, "Restrictions on Collective Bargaining"
and "Collective Bargaining: Area of Industrial Conflict," the author
makes a somewhat unexpected change in the arrangement. Rather than
continuing the historical account with the full story of the Taft-Hartley
Act, he turns to a topical treatment of various problems of collective
bargaining such as-to name only a few-control of the bargaining
unit, union security, enforcement of collective bargaining, the right to
strike, national emergency strikes, etc. Relative to each of these the role
of government is treated in its historical development, with maximum
emphasis on the change from the Wagner Act to the largely, but not
summarily, deplorable Taft-Hartley Act. The latter is criticized in
general for its anti-union intent and effect and its tendency to inject
a legalistic and punitive spirit into labor relations; in particular for its
unfair restrictions on union security (notably its indiscriminating pro-
hibition of the closed shop), for the return to the labor injunction,
and, most specially, for its interference with the substantive terms of
collective agreements.
A further brief part on "Wartime Controls of Collective Bargain-
ing" deals essentially with the work of the War Labor Board, its
restrictions of wage increases under the Little Steel formula, and its
compromise union-security scheme through "maintenance of member-
,ship." There are also glimpses towards the controls under the present
emergency.
Finally, under "Conclusions," the author introduces somewhat
hastily. the new topic of wage theories and collective bargaining. He
expresses the hope that, at least for normal conditions, government
interference with union wage policies will not be needed; that the unions
themselves will eventually develop a "national wage policy" which, with
a program once agreed upon, would make it "a simple matter to educate'
top union leadership to the vital economic necessity of a non-inflationary
3. P. 110.
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union wage policy; '"4 with the final conclusion-in line with the present-
day optimism-that "[controlled] inflation and full employment rather
than unemployment, collectivism, or government control over the eco-
nomic life could be the least of the evils." 5
'Appended are the full texts of the several federal statutes around
which the development centers and-very handy for the busy professor
-groups of five to six questions to each of the twenty-five chapters.
The above brief description should suggest the great amount of
material assembled and organized into this comprehensive, informative
account of a most complex development. The book should prove to be
,very useful, not only as a text for college labor courses, but also for
trade unionists wishing to gain a broader understanding of their prob-
lems, and to those managers and executives who are willing to listen
to "the other side" of the union story.
We wish to add a few critical and general remarks. Considering
the liberally broad-at times almost overbroad-scope of the material
included, it seems regrettable to this reviewer that the author did not
make more use of the thorough and revealing congressional debate on
the proposed amendments of the Taft-Hartley Act in the spring of 1949.
Of this he mentions hardly more than a few features of the ill-starred
Thomas bill. The debate on the Taft amendment of that bill (passed
by the Senate) with its many and not inconsiderable concessions to
the demands of labor seem a sure indicator of the-minimum improve-
ments in the law to be expected. (Senator Taft enumerated 22 such
improvements among which, to mention only two, were the abolition
of the union-shop elections and of the one-sidedness of the non-Com-
munist affidavit.)
This same debate would also have disclosed the many and varied
ideas and amendments proposed (e.g. by Senator Morse, and Senators
Douglas-Aiken) and difficulties found in the way of improving the
provisions for national emergency strikes. Instead, Mr. Witney offers
only his own "drastic" solution: government seizure, with workers
"expected" to continue work under previous conditions, and, "to balance
scales" as to pressure on the two parties, "confiscation of all profits
earned by the industry during the period of seizure." 6 This solution
appears to be defective in at least two respects. First, to make the unions
act their assigned part the hated injunction might, after all, have to





(as demonstrated by John L. Lewis' injunction-complying back-to-work
order disobeyed by the "rank and file"). Secondly, the pressure exerted
on management by the confiscation of all profits would, in most instances,
be much stronger than that on the workers who would merely have
to continue for a while under previous conditions. This scheme would
essentially place the coercive powers of government on the side of the
unions, regardless of the merit of their demands. 7
Next, there is a question regarding the author's treatment of the
issue of legislative as contrasted with judicial modes of government
interference in labor relations. Mr. Witney expresses himself in prin-
ciple strongly in favor of legislation," and against judicial lawmaking,
especially in the form of injunctions:
In legislative bodies, the issue of policy is decided by a repre-
sentative body. But in injunction cases, the judge alone, moti-
vated by his beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices, decides the
issues.9
In this connection he takes to task a recent decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court10 upholding an injunction against a strike for union
security, because "[n]o law enacted by the legislature of that state has
outlawed such strikes."" But in thus lea*ing nothing between statutes
enacted by legislative bodies and the individual prejudices of individual
judges, does the author not disregard the whole role of common law, on
which non-arbitrary decisions may be based in the absence of statute
law? In fact, the Massachusetts Court upheld the injunction on the
basis of a whole line of precedents under Massachusetts' common law.
Another of our scruples concerns the way in which the author
enlists numerical data to support his views. As one of several instances
we cite his repeated contention that union-membership figures prove
7. The Douglas-Aiken amendment, to which Mr. Witney's proposal bears a certain
resemblance, also provided for Government seizure under proper safeguards. But instead
of "confiscation of profits" it contemplated "just compensation for the owners," with the
Government merely deducting its own operation costs. It also provided for the "duty
of labor organizations" to keep their members at work during the period of seizure,
but with provision for the United States President to ask for an injunction in case of
non-compliance. The difference between such an injunction and that provided under
Taft-Hartley, Senator Douglas emphatically pointed out in the debate, was that it
would require workers to continue work for the Government, not for private employers.
95 CoNG. REc. 7798 (1949).
8. Occasionally however, when disapproving of a particular piece of legislation,
Mr. Witney labels it as mere "government edict." P. 278. Also he criticizes legislative
interference with practices established by the NLRB, i.e., Board-made law "even upheld
by the Supreme Court." P. 317. By contrast, Dr. William Leiserson, as a member of
the NLRB, dissented repeatedly from decisions amounting to Board-made law as "un-
authorized by Congress." See e.g., Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942).
9. P. 50.
10. Colonial Press, Inc. v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.2d 1 (1947).
11. P. 49.
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the detrimental effect of the Taft-Hartley Act on the union movement
which indeed, due to this law, has "ground to a halt."' 2 This "proof"
lies essentially .in a single figure supposedly showing an abnormally
small increase in membership during the first year after Taft-Hartley,
in'comparison to the much greater, increases in the "peacetime years
of the Wagner Act."
On the one hand, this increase-only very approximately known-
is hardly significantly smaller than those in immediately' preceding
years.'3 On the other, the asserted causal nexus with the Taft-Hartley
Act is largely open to question. While the almost explosive growth
in union membership in 1937 was doubtless due primarily to the protec-
tion given to the right to organize by the Wagner Act, it was co-condi-
tioned by the previous retardation of union organization in the mass
production industries; so that, with automobile, steel, oil, rubber, elec-
trical appliances, etc., suddenly organizing,- membership figures natur-
ally soared. A persistently diminishing rate of increase was discernible
by about 1943 (especially when taken relative to the increasing labor
force); apparently indicative of the greater resistance to unioniza-
tion in the remaining non-union areas, due partly to the nature of the
industries, notably trade and agriculture, partly to the social backward-
ness and local mores of the working populati6 n, plus unfavorable state
laws, especially in the South. That the Taft-Hartley Act has in various
ways added to the difficulties of organizing these areas, is more than
likely. But the "proof" is certainly not in the figures cited.
We mention this point not so much for the sake of the particular
facts in question, but for that of a principle. There is so much biased
citing of statistical figures in the world around us-through press and
radio, in politics, and in the pleadings of all special interests. Hence, it
would seem especially desirable that students be taught to cautiously,
critically, and objectively interpret statistical figures. This objective will
be difficult to attain so long as their teachers persist in indiscriminately
using statistical material to substantiate their own views.
Finally, there is a broader question of principle regarding govern-
ment and collective bargaining, apropos not merely of the present
12. P. 474.
13. According t6 the United States Department of Labor (Bur. of Labor Statistics
Bull., No. 937) annual variations in union membership since the Wagner Act have
ranged from an all-time high of about 3 million in 1937 to an actual decrease by about
100,000 in 1940; rising fluctuatingly to an average of about 1 million per year during
the war, and down again to an average of about 300,000 per year between 1945-47;
vherefore the roughly 260,00 increase for 1948 can hardly be regarded as out of the
ordinary, especially since Mr. Witney himself points out that current membership
figures are not known with any degree of accuracy. (The 1951 World Almanac gives
the last years' membership as somewhere between 14 and 16.8 millions).
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author's views, but of those of a whole school of thought. This ques-
tion concerns the explicit or implicit claim that the proper and legitimate
role for government is to "guarantee free collective bargaining," but
that it is highly improper and, indeed, detrimental for government to
"intervene in the substantive terms of collective agreements." To have
entered upon this course is, according to many, among the very worst
features of the Taft-Hartley Act.14 The present book abounds in asser-
tions to this effect.15 This thesis we wish to challenge.
The first question is, why should government have to intervene
at all to "guarantee" free collective bargaining? Why was it not enough
to have the Norris-La Guardia Act protect union activities against inter-
ference by injunctions, and thus leave unions and management truly
"free" to settle their mutual issues? Why did government have to enter
under the Wagner Act with all its far-flung machinery to set up bar-
gaining units, hold representation elections, certify majority unions, and
stop employers from committing "unfair labor practices ?"
The pertinence of the question appears when it is noted that most
other industrial countries with well developed trade unionism do not
have any government interference of this particular kind. The reason
why this was necessary on the American scene was because of the
American employers' widespread and extreme hostility, fighting unionism
and collective bargaining with a degree of success unparalleled in other
countries. Thus, a peculiar problem called for this solution through an
unusual form of government intervention in labor relations.
Secondly, when the government admittedly needed to get and keep
collective bargaining rolling, why should it be so categorically undesirable
for government also to regulate certain terms 'of collective agreements
where this is found necessary to prevent socially undesirable, or to insure
socially desirable, policies?
Let us take, as an example, the case of union security. To prevent
'certain well-known abuses under such contracts government can inter-
vene either by regulating the unions themselves (e.g. specify fees and
dues, proscribe exclusive admission policies, and regulate the adminis-
14. In Taft-Hartley there are four such instances of interference with the sub-
stantive terms of collecting agreements, all but the first, in our opinion, quite defensible
on grounds of intrinsic merits and fairness: 1) restrictions on union-security contracts,
2) prohibition of feather-bedding, 3) regulation for the joint administration of industrial
pension and other welfare funds, and 4) provisions for the final determination of juris-
dictional disputes through the NLRB, failing their settlement through the unions' own
machinery. All these four instances are fully and critically discussed in Professor
Taylor's GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, c. 6 (1948). Mr. Witney's
specific criticism of this type of government interference is chiefly turned against the
union-security provisions. Pp. 311 et seq.
15. See Pp. 278, 280, 281, 410, and 619.
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tration of union discipline); or it can leave the unions alone and restrict
union-security contracts, thereby "interfering with the terms of collec-
tive agreements." The former, apparently "legitimate" method is
strongly opposed by the unions as "interference with their private
affairs ;" nor is it used by the Taft-Hartley Act. But it has been used
in varying degrees of stringency and fairness by a number of states,
in particular under Fair Employment Practice laws prohibiting exclusion
from union membership on account of race, creed, national origin, etc.
This method is also advocated by many legislators and authors, includ-
ing Mr. Witney.16 The latter, supposedly "illegitimate" method was
used first under the New Deal Railway Labor Act of 1934 prohibiting
all union-security contracts;'17 next by the Wagner Act's restricting
them to the duly designated majority bargaining agent;1s next by a
number of state laws regulating such contracts more narrowly than
the Wagner Act (some of them, in our opinion, very fairly by balancing
security to the unions with protection for individual workers) ;19 then
by a number of obviously anti-union state laws altogether forbidding
union security, (anti-union because operating in exactly those areas
where the extant weakness of the unions makes union security most
necessary); and finally by the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibition of the
closed shop and narrow limitations on the union shop.
Either form of intervention, we find, may be used fairly or unfairly,
wisely or unwisely. Why is the one, on principle, more objectionable
than the other?
Or consider as another most important example the economic terms,
notably wages and hours, of collective bargaining agreements. In the
United States the Federal Government has "interfered" with such terms
only indirectly, in two ways, both eventually accepted as necessary in
spite of being limitations on "free" collective bargaining. First, the
fixing of legal minimum terms under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and similar laws in an attempt to strengthen labor's bargaining powers
16. Pp. 335 et seq.
17. This prohibition, for which there were fairly good reasons at the time, was
enacted over the protests of the Railroad Brotherhoods. See BmusrNTE , THE NEw
DEAL CoLLECTIwE BARMAUNING POLICY 51 (1950). Recently, yielding to the persistent
demand of the unions, this prohibition was repealed and replaced by a union-shop
formula similar to that of the Taft-Hartley Act. Pub. L. No. 914, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(Jan. 10, 1951).
18. This Wagner Act restriction is often classed as being not "interference with
the terms of collective bargaining," but merely as "setting the rules of the game" by
government. We fail to see the merit of this distinction.
19. Notably those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts. N.H. RE'. LAws c. 195
(1947) (later repealed because too much in conflict with Tart-Hartley) ; MASS. GEN.
LAWs c. 657 (1947).
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where it was too weak on its own account. Secondly, the placing of
ceiling limitations on wage increases to prevent inflation, used in war-
time and the present emergency. Otherwise our traditional devotion
to "voluntaryism" has operated against direct interference. Even in
deadlocked disputes giving rise to "emergency" strikes, federal law, both
under the Railway Labor and Taft-Hartley Acts, has strictly refrained
from prescribing the terms of settlement to be imposed.2 0
Other undeniably democratic countries, on the other hand, have
felt no compunction about government intervening directly in fixing
various terms of agreements; e.g. through more or less continual regula-
tion of wages and hours; the laying down of legal minima for paid
vacations; legally extending the scope of representative agreements to
the whole industry; or, in deadlocked disputes, making temporarily
binding awards either through permanent wage boards, or' state concilia-
tors, or through special legislation.2 1
It thus appears that there are many different ways in which demo-
cratic governments can and do attempt to solve problems of labor rela-
tions through legislative means, with controls applied at whatever point
deemed suitable. Why then this insistence among us that, whatever the
controls are to be, they should not be applied to the "substantive terms
of collective agreements ?"
The chief, if not the only, reason which these advocates of "free"
collective bargaining seem to offer is that every instance of this particular
kind of government interference is a breach in the ramparts of -our
"free economy," threatening to lead to "all-out" regulation, 22 to totali-
tarianism, if not dictatorship. In the words of the present author:
If the present law [Taft-Hartley] is a precursor of still greater
government control, the terms of employment will not be deter-
mined by employers and employees in the collective bargaining
process, but by government edict. (sic!) Such a state of affairs
.. . is wholly incompatible with a free economy, for govern-
ment control of the terms of employment could easily be the
prelude to general control of all economic activity.23
20. State laws have occasionally resorted to direct interference. Examples are the
Kansas Industrial Court of the 1920's, and the more recent laws for settling disputes in
public utilities in the last resort by binding governmental awards, under simultaneous
prohibition of strikes. These laws have, partly at least, been held invalid either under
the Constitution or under the Taft-Hartley Act.
21. A great variety of such regulations is discussed in Extent of Collective Bargain-
ing in Seven European Countries, 64 MON. LAB. REv. 1019 (1947); See also MARQUAND,
ORGANIZED LABOR IN FOUR CONTINENTS (1939).
22. TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 14, at 371.
23. P. 278.
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These dire predictions, we believe, are quite unfounded. Govern-
ment regulation of economic enterprise, it is true, is likely to increase
in modern industrial society, notwithstanding our unshaken faith in
the ideal of maximum voluntaryism, just as more regulation is needed
for city automobile traffic than for driving buggies on country lanes.
And of such regulations labor relations will receive the greater share
the less capable-subjectively and objectively-the bargaining parties
are to do the right and wise thing by the community as well as by
themselves. 24 The forms which such government intervention as-
sumes will vary with the nature of the problems to be solved, with the
institutional set-up, and with the traditions of the communities. The
criterion for their appraisal, however, should be merely their fairness,
practicability, and effectiveness, not the exact place in the economy where
they are applied.
Moreover, there seems nothing inevitable about the "course" which
a government such as ours may enter upon. Far from being bound to
stay on any set course, a democratic gqvernment is-in the language of
Cybernetics25-a highly sensitive "feedback" system, perpetually read-
justing its course by way of reacting to the effects of its previous actions.
Where particular regulations of the terms of agreements are found
impractical and unsound they can easily be altered or withdrawn and
replaced by other methods. Hence, no great point of principle seems
indeed involved in this issue of "government regulation of the terms
of agreements."
JOHN V. SPIELMAISy
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE. By Robert L. Stern* and Eugene
Gressman.** Washington: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1950.
Pp. xii, 553. $7.50.
ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES. By Richard F. Wolfson*** and Philip B. Kur-
land.**** Albany and New York: Matthew Bender & Co., 1951. Pp.
xxxii, 1147. $27.50.
24. On the development of this idea see Slichter, The Chan'ging American Ecolomy,
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 2, 1949.
25. WIENER, CYBERNETIcs (6th ed., 1949).
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